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Flight from Reality:
Hitler as Party Leader and Dictator in
the Third Reich

HANS MOMMSEN
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~ the one hand a tremendous reduction of the overwhelming
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variety of singular events. On the other hand historiography relies on
constant generalization of concrete historical evidence. In the case of
the history of the Third Reich, the complex variety of political and
social interaction generally is reduced to the predominant role of its
indisputable leader, Adolf Hitler. Hence, historians and journalists frequently refer to the Third Reich by introducing the term "Hitler's Germany" or by using the term "Hitlerism" to signify the specific ideological
pattern of the Nazi political system. From such a viewpoint, the history of Germany between 1933 and 1945 appears to be essentially the
life story of its dictator and his deeds or, following the interpretation
of Joachim C. Fest's outstanding biography, Hitler's "political career."
Actually, Joachim Fest, as many historians before him, has tried to
take Hitler's personal biography as the focus for describing the rather
amorphous chain of events leading from the Nazi seizure of power to
the military and political destruction of the German Reich in May 1945.
Fest has justified his approach by attributing "historical greatness" to
Hitler, although in a purely negative sense; and by maintaining that
the concept of "historical greatness;' as originally formulated by the
famous Swiss historian Carl Jacob Burckhardt, came to its very end with
Hitler. The criminal and inhuman character of his rule, however, makes
it difficult to accept such a frame of reference and proves that it is inadequate to interpret the history of the Third Reich from a basically
idealistic historiographical approach. In conjunction with this, it is
worthwhile to recollect Burckhardt's distinction between great personalities in history and those who appear to act as pure destroyers,
such as Genghis Khan and others.
Nevertheless, the Hitler-centristic interpretation of the Nazi regime
still prevails in the historical profession. Recently, the West German
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historian Eberhard Jaeckel, whose booklet on "Hitler's Weltanschauung" has found extensive interest (available also in an English translation under the significant title "Blueprint for Power''), published a
small survey on Hitler's rule with the subtitle "Implementation of the
Weltanschauung." Jaeckel argues that the German dictator had completed his future political program already in the mid-twenties in his
two-volume book, Mein Kampf He maintains that Hitler's so-called
"Weltanschauung'' was not a vague collection of ideological pretensions
and indefinite political targets, but a consistent political philosophy that
already contained the basic elements of the political course he followed
after gaining the chancellorship in 1933. Consequently, Jaeckel depicts
the development of the Nazi political system, its foreign policy, and
its war policy as the consistent implementation of Hitler's goals already
formulated in 1924.
Although Jaeckel is the foremost defender of a Hitler-centristic interpretation, he is by no means alone. The theory of totalitarian dictatorship, originally to depict the conditions in Stalinist Russia, was
applied to Nazi Germany by outstanding scholars like Wheeler-Bennett
or Trevor-Roper and subsequently found broad acceptance among
historians, mainly by the West German school, which has been characterized by Timothy Mason as "intentionalist." Karl Dietrich Bracher
and a group of historians who were working mainly in the field of Nazi
foreign policy argued along similar lines, maintaining that basically the
Nazi regime pursued a political strategy whose main elements and essential targets were already fixed in Hitler's mind, although he did not
disclose his real political targets even to his most intimate followen; until
the time was ripe. Simultaneously, Hitler, according to this interpretation, provided his subleaders only with partial information, thereby
hiding his arcanum dominatWnis and securing his indisputable political
leadership. The similarity of this interpretation with the conspiracy theory that guided the prosecution in the Nuremberg military trials is evident, except that here the conspiracy does not include all of the German
leading elites but is restricted to Hitler alone.
Related to this general historiographical approach is the assumption
presented by Andreas Hillgruber and his school that Hitler pursued
a long-term foreign policy that was to be realized in three stages: the
first to restore the German freedom to act and destroy the Treaty of
Versailles, the second to gain preponderance on the European continent and conquer living space in the east, and the third to acquire world
domination. Most historians agree that Hitler pursued a deliberate
strategy of waging war against the rival European powers, while they
admit that Hitler had to change parts of his design because of tactical
deliberations. The tendency to draw a direct line from Hitler's programmatic considerations in Mein Kampf to his later foreign policy is also
familiar among American historians, especially in the case of Norman
Rich and his book on Hitler's war aims; Gerhard Weinberg, who is
a leading expert in the field of German foreign policy during this period,
puts the weight rather on Hitler's expansionism in general, although
he is convinced that the German dictator acted according to a deliberate and fairly rational concept.
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The intentionalist school would not raise the question of why Hitler
decided to take the next step and what political pressures might be
responsible for the remarkable acceleration of his time schedules, especially with regard to the immediate preparation for war. Many biographers refer to psychological reasons that made Hitler feel that time
ran against him without analyzing the domestic political conditions
that possibly made him feel that way. Alternatively, psychohistorians
like Robert Waite and Rudolf Binion presented additional explanations
for what can be called an accelerating radicalization of the methods
and targets of Nazi policy. But even a comprehensive and, by the way,
noncontroversial knowledge of Hitler's psyche and personal motivations will not help much to identify the link between the announcement of mainly ideological goals and their actual implementation . A
closer analysis of the internal political process within the Third Reich
and of considerably important moves in foreign policy shows that a
great many initiatives that necessarily implied a higher degree of political militancy were not inaugurated by Hitler himself, although they
were tolerated and frequently indirectly favored by the dictator. The
often-articulated argument that no political move of relevance could
have been started without the expressed consent of Hitler cannot relieve
the historian from the necessity of analyzing the circumstances under
which Hitler's more or less imaginary political concepts were actually
implemented.

A
~

NY COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS of the Third
Reich that uses Hitler's personality as the key for explaining
what actually happened meets the difficulty that the dictator simply
did not possess the extraordinary qualifications that would have been
necessary to control and instigate the political events as suggested by
the intentionalist school. Even Joachim Fest referred to him as a "nonperson;' and Peter Stern, who wrote an extremely interesting biographical analysis of Hitler, called him a "Mr. Nobody." In fact, Hitler's private life, his ideas, his lifestyle, his intellectual interests would not deserve
any mention if it were not for the fatal destructive repercussions of the
man's political career. Myriads of biographers and specialists have
described his private life, his interests in films, operas, city planning,
and architecture, as well as his reading and other influences upon him.
But all this does not reveal anything original in the sense that it distinguishes Hitler's personality from other volkisch postwar sectarians (besides his paranoiac psychology). Apart from his propaganda speeches
or political acts, Hitler appeared to be a shy, reluctant, and noncommunicative individual. He needed mass audiences as a medium, and
even in the inner circle around him he would not relax, except for his
sometimes submissive behavior toward chauffeurs, secretaries, and members of his bodyguard. Even his photographic postures with his dogs,
with Eva Braun, and with children and visitors at the Obersalzberg were
staged. Actually, the man was characterized by a complete absence of
any human contact, sexual relations included.
The poverty of Hitler as an individual makes it extremely difficult
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to explain his immense political success. The clue to overcoming this
contradiction has been brilliantly pointed out by Peter Stern, who
makes it quite clear that Hitler achieved a personality by entering public life. Only his public role gave to his individual existence any significant meaning. Hence, he was psychologically disposed to act as
mediator between the resentments of relevant sections of German society and the political process. There exist many descriptions of how
Hitler managed to achieve contact with varying audiences, always trying to adapt his arguments to the prevailing mood and to the sweeping resentments of his listeners. In this almost inconceivable capability
to articulate the sociopsychological needs and political resentments of
a generation who had gone through the traumatic experiences of the
First World War and was deeply affected by the postwar economic conditions (especially the inflation and hyperinflation that impaired the
social status primarily of the lower middle class and the small peasants)
lay the key to his success as a public speaker.
The basic phenomenon that is to be explained is the obvious success of Hitler as propaganda speaker in the Munich area through the
early 1920s. The counterrevolutionary climate in the Bavarian capital
was greatly intensified by the abortive Soviet republic in Munich, but
it originated in the extensive activities of the emerging vi::ilkisch and
nationalistic movement there, which after 1919 exploited the deep antiPrussian resentments for their struggle against the allegedly communistinfluenced Weimar Republic. Hitler, who formed his political concepts
during the early postwar period, more than from reminiscences of his
Viennese period, learned to represent the needs of those social strata
who despised politics as such and blamed the republic for their personal misfortune. Actually, Hitler's personal prejudices, as well as his
status insecurity, corresponded to the characteristics of the core of his
later followers. But one should not overestimate Hitler's demagogic
popularity during the twenties. Men like Gregor Strager had a greater
impact on public opinion than Hitler, whose plebiscitary appeal became predominant only in the early thirties.
It is quite significant that Hitler launched his first seizure of power,
within the early Nazi party, not as a member of the party apparatus
but as a relatively independent, but also indispensable, propaganda
speaker. With the support of a considerably small clique of close admirers within the Munich local organization of the Nazi party, Hitler
was able to remodel the party after his ideas and, simultaneously, after
his personal inclinations. He claimed unlimited loyalty on the part of
the subleaders while ceding to them complete freedom of action, except for programmatical issues, whose treatment remained his unrestricted prerogative. His function as unchallenged party leader (he
prudently managed that Ludendorff was eliminated as a potential rival
in 1925) relied on an extreme degree of personalization of politics. The
complete personal dependency of each subsequent leader upon his superior was a remarkably simple and effective principle as long as the
movement remained basically a huge propaganda organization without
the need of serious political proposals or objective political obligations.
Except for the period between 1921 and 1923, Hitler neglected rou-
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tine business in the party leadership and spent most of his time in the
Munich coffeehouses and the salons of several sympathetic upper-class
women. He did not show any interest in organizational issues. The
establishment of an efficient and increasingly bureaucratic party apparatus was not his work but that of Gregor StraBer, Heinrich Rimmler,
and after 1930, JosefGoebbels. It is symptomatic of his distrust in any
bureaucratic hierarchy in the party that Hider dissolved the central party
agencies that had been built up by StraBer to control the local and
regional organizations and to lay the foundations for participation in
government. He justified this decision with the argument that the party
had to be first of all the bearer of the National Socialist idea and had
the main task of spreading it throughout the country, and that
bureaucratic organization and control were obstacles to its basically
propagandistic tasks.
Hider's spontaneous order to dissolve the greater part of the central party machinery (which was designed to prepare the party for the
expected takeover of power) proves his particularly propagandistic understanding of politics and his inclination to reduce politics to a neverending fanaticization of the masses and to a buildup of a sworn-in body
of subleaders, which was signified by unrestricted loyalty to the
"Fuehrer." The leadership cult, not the party program and its ideology, secured the unity of the movement that otherwise contained heterogeneous elements and diverging political viewpoints, ranging from
left-wing groups to procapitalist and even promonarchistic elements.
The establishment of the Hider myth was the work of his Munich fellow travelers in order to stabilize Hider's control over the party and
thereby to secure predominant influence for themselves. But Hider
adapted himself rapidly to the role designed by the leadership cult that
paid lip service to the expectations of the masses that Germany's misery could be overcome by a strong authoritarian leadership.
In spite of the extensive biographical studies of Hider's political
career, we do not know very much of his techniques to control the
work of his subordinates. He usually gave them a free hand in preparing the election campaigns and the organizational buildup. Without
the rather independent work by Gregor StraBer, the NSDAP never
would have achieved the breakthrough to the formation of a mass movement after 1929. Hider would reserve the more spectacular public activities for himself, as, for example, the negotiations with the bourgeois
right-wing parties in Thuringia or Saxony to form a coalition government. Otherwise, even during the crucial period in 1931-32 he stayed
in the background except for his role as the top party speaker. Hider
hesitated to run in the presidential elections in April 1932, and he accepted the candidature at the very last moment under the pressure of
the party membership, which would not have understood a nomination of Wilhelm Frick or some other leading party functionary. The
negotiations with Franz von Papen that eventually led to Hider's chancellorship were neither started by Hider nor did he engage himself personally before a definite agreement was in sight. Hence, in the field
of party negotiations he acted rather cautiously and reluctandy, fearing a loss of personal prestige in the event of failure. During the crucial
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period before the seizure of power he pursued a policy of avoiding
definite options, believing in the ultimate strength of the National Socialist idea and the final victory of his movement despite the accumulating signs of intraparty crisis and imminent decay. Almost none of
Hitler's close followers thought his all-or-nothing policy line had the
slightest chance of succeeding. But it did, due to the miscalculations
of his conservative partners.
It is against this background that Hitler's role as German dictator
has to be perceived. Once in power he did not change his style oflife,
his habits, or his political perspectives, which still were devoted more
to the anti-Semitic and nationalistic inheritance of the Wilhelmine
period than to the ideas prevailing in the twenties. Hitler disliked regular
work; only during the short period after the formation of the government of the national concentration did he show up in the Reich chancellory in order to perform routine business, and he did this only as
long as the Reich's president, von Hindenburg, stayed in Berlin. He
hated to preside over cabinet meetings, where he feared appearing less
well informed than the professionalized cabinet members and their staff
personnel. Hence, he preferred to instruct the leading members of the
government indirectly, talking only to a small body of personally loyal
advisers. As in the twenties, he did not feel comfortable in Berlin, and
he despised bureaucratic procedures, regarding the civil service as a
necessary evil at best. Hence, he used to fly to Munich and the Obersalzberg and communicated only indirectly with the top personnel of
his government.
The conservative camarilla that was responsible for Hitler's chancellorship expected that Hitler would curb his radicalism when he entered the office, being convinced that the extremist elements of his
propaganda were designed to hold the radical groups within the NSDAP
in line. To some extent they were justified, because the new chancellor
presented himself at first in a rather moderate image, at least in his frequent public appearances. The more radicalized elements of the party
were disappointed that Hitler did not abrogate the formal constitutional framework, although there were considerable changes in the actual institutional structure even before the passing of the enabling law
in March 1933. By nominating Rudolf Hess as the virtual party leader
under the title of the Deputy of the Fuehrer, Hitler did not fulfill the
party's expectation that it would take over the government directly,
as he had promised in Mein Kampf Only under very strong pressures
by Hermann Goring did Hitler accept the latter's demand to become
invested with the Prussian minister presidentship. Even in 1935, Hitler
outrightly rejected the proposition by the minister of interior, Wilhelm
Frick, to introduce a new constitution for the Great German Reich
and instead preferred to use the Enablement Act as the legal foundation for his rule.
By propagating the leadership cult, Goebbels successfully portrayed
the Third Reich as a monolithic structure pursuing in every respect
Hitler's expressed will. The reality, however, was far more complex.
What arose was a political system that was described by a high civil
servant in the Reich chancellory (which nominally was in charge of po-
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litical coordination between the different ministries and party agencies)
as "up to now well organized chaos." In fact, Hitler's apprehension to
cooperate either with the cabinet or with an informal staff of party functionaries produced a constellation in which no agency, whether it belonged to the state or the party, could be sure that its competencies
were not usurped by a competing power group and in which effective
political influence was dependent upon personal relations and not institutional patterns. Hence, the political decision-making process depended completely upon the degree to which Hitler would utilize his
steering power. But in the case of many political issues that did not
arouse his interest he just left his subordinates alone and was inclined
to postpone even decisions that were overdue.

l\\VA\\the

ANY BIOGRAPHERS HAVE FAILED to deal with

question of the role Hitler performed in the day-to-day
governmental process. In general he restricted his interference in the
governmental system by outlining the short- and long-term goals of
the regime in public speeches, but rarely in internal meetings of party
leaders and government officials. Mostly his directives were rather vague
and immediately elicited diverging interpretations by the competing
subsystems, which proliferated because of Hitler's habit of constantly
creating new agencies to solve immediate problems, thereby duplicating institutions. He adhered to the questionable principle that it was
sufficient to put the right person in charge, without coordinating the
latter's task with already existing agencies. Consequently, the Nazi regime was marked by the lack of any systematic coordination or even
communication at the top. This was the main principle of running the
Nazi party before 1933; now it recurred as a basic governmental guideline. Additionally, Hitler ruled predominantly on the basis of oral
negotiations with quite a few ministers, among them the chief of the
Reich chancellory and some influential party leaders, but preferring to
prepare political moves within a very small circle of advisers. He would
deliver his orders on the basis of mainly oral information. Except for
outstanding diplomatic issues Hitler avoided studying files, and there
are few instances of his handwriting in government files. This is one
of the most striking differences between Hitler and Mussolini, who
used to read all relevant documents carefully. Moreover, the memoranda
presented to Hitler (in the typical extralarge typewritten letters, because
Hitler hesitated to wear glasses when he met visitors) are fairly exceptional, and it is not even certain that he read them at all. If the files
of the party chancellory had survived (the Institute for Zeitgeschichte
in Munich recently published the first volume of a secondary reconstruction of the party chancellory files), one would not find much relevant material concerning Hitler's policy making.
These experiences make it fairly improbable that Hitler persistently
pursued a well-planned and sophistically staged political course. During the first years of his dictatorship he interfered in the actions of the
ministerial departments only occasionally. Recent studies have shown
that except for the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, the German for-
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eign minister, Baron von Neurath, acted rather independently from,
although in principal accordance with, Hitler. Decisive actions in foreign and domestic policy were not inaugurated by Hitler himself. Th,
impression of many contemporaries that it was crucial which advisers
influenced Hitler proved to be correct in many respects. Actually Hitler
hesitated to identify himself with any political proposition that had
uncertain outcomes, and his main motivation lay in the fear that he
could be compelled to withdraw a former order, which might give the
impression that he acted contradictorily. Out of the same deliberation
he rarely was ready to dismiss leading officials even when he regarded
them as no longer efficient. He postponed the replacement of Frick
for more than two years, and he hesitated to call in a new minister of
justice after the death ofGiirtner (who took that office already in 1932) .

]HI

ENCE, THE CRUCIAL QUESTION is to what ex-

tent Hitler himself was the source of the escalating radicalization offoreign and domestic policies that characterized the Nazi regime. Hitler's rule relied upon a mixture of his visionary concepts on
the one hand and upon a rather instinctive sense for preserving his function as mediator between competing power alliances on the other.
While he delivered the most ardent anti-Semitic speeches, he frequently
pursued a rather moderate line in cases of conflict among the subleaders,
certainly from the perspective that any provisional compromise might
be superseded by a final solution, a term that is not at all restricted
to the so-called "Jewish question;' but familiar in almost every field
of politics. From the viewpoint of achieving in the long run the dream
of a thousand-year Reich, provisional solutions appeared only as tactical devices. This explains the high degree of tactical flexibility that characterized Nazi propaganda as well as the implementation of its goals in
the Third Reich .
Hitler's role within the continual strife between rival power groups,
which pursued diverging political targets without any lasting coordination, was crucial insofar as in almost all cases, he would defend even
criminal activities by radicalized party functionaries and withdrew any
legal sanctions against them. Thus he supported illegal actions by party
agencies that seemed to fulfill the targets of the party's program. This
certainly is but a partial solution to the problem of how the revolutionary vision held by Hitler and his fellow ideologues within the movement was in many respects actually implemented, or why
Weltanschauung and reality merged . Martin Broszat, one of the leading West German experts in this field, provided a preliminary answer
by arguing that Hitler was taken at his own word, i.e., utterances by
Hitler that stood in a primarily propagandistic context were taken by
the party radicals at fuce value. What was meant metaphorically thereby
became actual policy. This approach toward to more satisfactory explanation of the process of cumulative radicalization (instead of the
assumption that Hitler concealed his fur-reaching goals while having
them constantly in mind in a more or less rational perception) has as
its precondition that Hitler as chancellor remained primarily an ideo-
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logical demagogue informed by a highly selective perception of the real
conditions of the surrounding world.
It is the fate of many authoritarian politicians to ultimately become
victims of their own illusions, because they increasingly lose the ability and the readiness to face any information that contradicts their views
and refutes their intentions. From the very start of his political career,
Hitler tended to repress inconvenient truths that ran opposite to his
imaginary vision of restoring the German nation and its political unity
as well as its racial homogeneity. A good part of his personal impact
relied on this phenomenon, which Peter Stern described in terms of
Hitler's philosophy of the will. Actually, the politics of the party leader
and the later dictator were based on the assumption that any obstacle
in the surrounding political world could be overcome by fanatical
resolve. At the end of the Second World War Hitler based his confidence in a final German victory more on the fanaticism of the German soldier than on the availability of new weapons, which were
announced by the unremitting propaganda of Joseph Goebbels.
The conservative partners of Hitler were convinced that political
responsibility would force Hitler into a greater understanding of political realities. But his indisputable political achievements in domestic
as well as in foreign policy had the opposite effect. Hitler, who always
behaved like a gambler, became increasingly convinced that his missionary role as the savior of Germany was correct and that he did not
need the support either of trained political advisers or of professional
civil servants. What he undertook was an escalating flight from reality,
and he did not take sufficient notice of the available resources for the
world historical power play he set in motion. Even his closest followers
doubted whether Hitler's ambitious expansionist policy would be successful. In September 1939, almost all members of the inner circle feared
a Second World War, which Germany was not sufficiently prepared to
wage.
A different question is why traditional leaders did not express opposition to Hitler; or why their views could be so easily dismissed by
him as lack of confidence in the Fuehrer and his historical mission.
To explain this, we have to analyze the political system and the underlying social and economic interests. (This, however, cannot be the task
of this essay.) There were many cases in which Hitler refrained from
his objectives under immediate political pressure, although he always
tended to overcome opposition by deviousness. Keeping this in mind,
we cannot overlook the responsibility of the elites, including Hitler's
national-conservative allies. Hitler always needed perpetrators who implemented the usually obscure intentions of the dictator and who were
motivated by a mixture of obedience and adoration for Hitler's genius.
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